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Harker 1
Introduction
On June 17, 2019, Egypt’s first and only civilian president, Muhammad Morsi, collapsed
from a heart attack while standing trial in a military court. The 67-year-old Morsi was facing
nearly half a century in prison six years after he was removed from power in a military coup.
Morsi was pronounced dead upon arriving at a Cairo hospital, prompting the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Islamist movement he had once led, to accuse the Egyptian regime of
committing “full-fledged murder.”1
Less than four months later, Tunisian voters flocked to the polls to choose a new
president and parliament for the second time in their country’s history. 2 Despite continuing to
face severe economic challenges and repeated security threats, Tunisia remains the Arab world’s
lone true democracy. That success has, in large part, unfolded under the supervision of Tunisia’s
most prominent Islamist group—the Ennahda Movement. Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahda’s
founder, has played a central role in crafting the policies which have guided the Tunisian
democratic transition and currently serves as the speaker of parliament. 3
Nine years after the events of the Arab Spring, it would seem that the political climates of
these two countries could not be more different. In Egypt, an exceptionally authoritarian military
regime has quashed any meaningful political opposition and tightly restricts civil liberties.4
Tunisia, by contrast, has developed a vigorous multi-party democracy and regularly holds free
and fair elections. Freedom House, a research institute that evaluates the robustness of political
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rights and civil liberties around the world, has rigorously documented the widening disparity
between Egyptian and Tunisian democratization (figure 1).5
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Note: Higher scores indicate worse conditions for political rights and civil liberties.
When popular uprisings toppled veteran autocrats in both countries, however, Egypt and
Tunisia seemed to be embarking on very similar trajectories. Both promptly conducted elections
that the international community deemed “competitive and credible,”6 and both voted in
governments led by Islamist political movements. What happened in the intervening decade?
Why did these two comparable Arab states experience such divergent outcomes in the wake of
their democratic revolutions?
In this paper, I analyze both structural and agent-based factors in the Egyptian and
Tunisian cases to develop a theory explaining their contrasting transitional outcomes.
Structurally, I scrutinize state institutions, émigré communities, and voter perceptions of
Islamism in both countries. Regarding agent-related variables, or variables concerning individual
actors, I focus on post-revolutionary actors including civil society organizations, Islamist
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political parties, and the military. Based on my analysis of these factors, I conclude that these
two cases were fundamentally similar in most structural respects, but subtle structural
differences shaped key groups of actors, which ultimately differed drastically. I identify three
actors whom I contend were most relevant to this study: the Islamists, the military, and civil
society. It was these agents which were most directly responsible for determining Egypt and
Tunisia’s political destinies after the Arab uprisings. I specifically argue that a conciliatory
Ennahda Movement bolstered Tunisians’ trust in their new democratic government, while
professionalized armed forces and a strong, independent civic sector protected the integrity of the
country’s transition. Conversely, I contend that the Muslim Brotherhood won too much power
too quickly, priming the group for a confrontation with the Egyptian military which felt
compelled to protect its economic interests. I further argue that Egypt’s weak civil society which
had largely been co-opted by the state accelerated the country’s backslide into despotism.
I support this theory with consideration of the two states’ contextual similarities in
addition to quantitative and qualitative analysis of their most relevant structural and agent-based
variables. I specifically devote the following section of this paper to briefly exploring the origins
of the Egyptian and Tunisian states in addition to the beginnings of their most influential Islamist
groups. I then draw from opinion polling data gathered between 2011 and 2014 to test my
hypotheses on how the contrasting behavior of Islamist parties affected those groups’ levels of
public support. By doing so, I seek to understand why demonstrators protested the Brotherhood
government in Egypt, triggering the group’s removal, but did not protest against Ennahda in
Tunisia. By contrast, I use detailed historical process tracing to test my hypotheses regarding the
role of the military in early Egyptian and Tunisian state-building, as well as the relationship
between the countries’ regimes and civil society groups. I exploit a similar blend of
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quantitative and qualitative analysis to test my hypotheses relating to the structural variables of
this study, including state bureaucracies, returned émigré populations, and the perceptions and
preferences of the two states’ electorates.
Background
The existing literature on this subject largely fits into two general areas: the effect of
structural or external variables on state outcomes and the effect of domestic actors on state
outcomes. While I acknowledge structure-oriented arguments in this paper, the majority of my
analysis draws from the work of scholars who primarily examined agent-related variables. I
distill their arguments in order to focus on the impact of the Islamists, military, and civil society
on Egypt and Tunisia’s divergent transitional outcomes.
In explaining the two countries’ contrasting post-revolutionary experiences, a small but
credible number of scholars contend that structural or external factors were most salient. For
instance, Masri postulates that Tunisia’s unique cultural identity made it inevitable that
democracy would eventually take root there. 7 He identifies the country’s long non-Arab and nonMuslim history, its partiality to Malikist Islam, and the modernizing reforms of Habib Bourguiba
as key factors which distinguished Tunisia from the rest of the Arab World and primed it to be
fertile ground for democratization. Masri essentially argues that Tunisia’s status as the region’s
lone true democracy is simply a realization of its destiny and it would be near impossible for
other Arab states to replicate Tunisia’s success. Moreover, Bishara contends that Egypt’s
authoritarian reversal as compared to Tunisia’s democratic consolidation was a function of the
former’s geopolitical importance and the Gulf states’ willingness to smother Egyptian
democratization in its infancy. He argues that the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was
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only the latest illustration of international actors’ impact on democratization, following decades
of American interference in the developing world during the Cold War.
Perhaps a more widespread school of thought contends that domestic actors—rather than
structural factors—were most responsible for the two Arab states’ different experiences.
Szmolka asserts that an inclusive political climate and participation from all influential political
actors at all stages of a transition are crucial to successful democratization. Furthermore, he
stipulates that electoral pluralism alone is not sufficient to guarantee a successful transition and
that all major political actors must be included in government even after elections have
concluded. Szmolka concludes that the hegemony of the Islamists in Egypt’s transition and the
multilateral coalition in Tunisia’s contributed to the former’s authoritarian reversal and the
latter’s democratic consolidation. Moreover, Bellin describes how Ennahda’s role in government
encouraged or at least failed to stifle democratic consolidation in Tunisia. She identifies
Ennahda’s commitment to a civil rather than an Islamic state, its tenuous plurality in parliament
and cooperation with secular parties, and its concessions to Tunisian labor unions as key
variables on the success of the transition. Finally, Brown argues that the SCAF’s seizure of the
Egyptian transition process early on doomed any chances of success for a civilian government.
He further emphasizes that political actors like the Muslim Brotherhood behaved illiberally not
because they weren’t committed to the democratic process, but rather they mistrusted their rivals
and the system’s capacity to protect them. Actors like the Brotherhood tried to accommodate the
military in order to stymie their civilian rivals, giving the generals ultimate power during the
transition.
In order to construct my own theory, I synthesize several of these arguments and focus on
the three actors previously mentioned. While I acknowledge the credibility of more structural
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theories, I maintain that structural variables were most influential in how they shaped state
actors. In turn, it was those actors who had the most direct effect on Egypt and Tunisia’s political
destinies after the Arab uprisings.

Similar Structures, Dissimilar Actors
Given Arend Lijphart’s analysis of the comparative method, Egypt and Tunisia seem to
be close to ideal cases for understanding the factors that influence post-revolutionary
transitional outcomes. Both countries are North African Arab states, so while the number of
potentially relevant explanatory variables for this study is “still very large, [it] is at least reduced
in the… happy choice of area.”8 The two countries also resemble each other in important
structural respects, including their experiences with colonialization, republican authoritarianism,
the Arab uprisings of 2011, and state institutions. However, key agent-related differences in
Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutionary mechanisms, their militaries, and the political backgrounds of
their respective Islamist groups hint at why they experienced such contrasting postrevolutionary trajectories. In this section, I contend that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases have
enough structural similarities to make a compelling comparative argument, but also important
agent-based differences which give crucial context for the divergent outcomes of their
democratic transitions.
Egypt and Tunisia’s analogous demographics and political histories generated state
conditions that were strikingly—if superficially—similar leading up to the Arab Spring. Both
countries had recently experienced prodigious youth bulges, both had grappled with stubbornly
high levels of unemployment, and both had overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim populations (though
Egypt has a sizeable Coptic Christian minority).910 Both states also trace their origins to periods
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of Ottoman and European subjugation. Egypt transitioned to Britain’s sphere of influence
following centuries of Ottoman rule in order to pay off massive debts incurred while building
infrastructure projects like the Suez Canal.11 Though the persistent efforts of nationalist
movements would win nominal Egyptian independence in 1925, a military coup two decades
later would give rise to a string of autocrats—Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni
Mubarak—who would shape Egypt into a modern, single-party police state.12 Tunisia’s colonial
and post-independence experience was remarkably similar. Much like Egypt, 19th century
Tunisia—long an Ottoman province—rapidly bankrupted itself trying to implement modernizing
reforms and subsequently became a vassal state of France, its primary foreign creditor.13 While
nationalists would overthrow France’s puppet monarchy in 1956, the Tunisian government
which followed—led by strongmen Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali—would be
brutally authoritarian.14 The 2011 revolution which toppled Ben Ali inspired Egyptian protesters
to clamor for Hosni Mubarak’s removal less than a month later.15
The Mubarak and Ben Ali administrations prior to these uprisings were comparably
repressive, and the core institutions of their regimes were only marginally different. Tunisian
state corruption and patronage were concentrated at the highest levels of government, close to
Ben Ali and his inner circle. Nonetheless, the bulk of his administration “did not depend on the
kind of accumulation of small bribes that subverted bureaucracy elsewhere.”16 The organization
of the Mubarak regime was somewhat more integrated, creating relatively more compromised
institutions which were less prepared to sustain “a clean, efficient, and technocratic government”
than those of Tunisia.17 Both sets of bureaucracies, however, were considerably more
professionalized than those of other Arab states such as Libya, and their ultimate impact on their
countries’ democratic transitions would be minimal.
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In spite of these demographic, historical, and institutional similarities, the Egyptian and
Tunisian states differed crucially both in the dynamics of their democratic revolutions and in
their militaries. In Tunisia, the 2011 uprising began in rural areas and “spiraled toward the
capital,”18 driven by a robust organized labor force which the Ben Ali regime had long repressed.
Egypt’s revolution, by contrast, was concentrated primarily in major cities like Cairo and relied
on “urbane and cosmopolitan young people” for its energy and sustainability. 19 Meanwhile,
Tunisia’s military was highly professionalized and largely removed from economic activity. The
Egyptian military, however, was much more proximate to the levers of state power and was
deeply involved in profiteering. I will discuss these critical military differences and their impact
on transitional outcomes in greater detail later in this paper.
Egypt and Tunisia’s most important non-state actors—the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Ennahda Movement—were notably similar in their ideological origins. In fact, by some
accounts, Ennahda was conceived as a Tunisian offshoot of the Brotherhood. Sayida Ounissi, a
Tunisian member of parliament and an Ennahda spokeswoman, acknowledged that Brotherhood
founder Hassan al-Bana heavily influenced the ideology of Tunisia’s nascent Islamist movement,
while more recent “Brotherhood publications were the main philosophical ‘food for thought’” for
the group’s Tunisian counterpart.20 Furthermore, both movements renounced violence in the
mid-1980s and sought to become legitimate players in their countries’ political arenas by
embracing democracy and pluralism. The Brotherhood specifically “[called] for an ‘Islamic civil
state’…that operates largely on democratic principles,” while Ennahda “explicitly accepted the
principles of democratic pluralism” even earlier. 21
Like the states in which they operated, however, the Brotherhood and Ennahda differed
in fundamental ways, particularly in terms of their early political experience. The Brotherhood,
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for one, had extensive experience competing and succeeding in national elections prior to the
2011 uprisings. The group entered electoral politics in 1984 when it formed an alliance with the
Wafd Party and won 59 out of 454 available seats in parliament. 22 Mubarak’s ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP) quickly annulled the elections’ results, claiming they unfairly excluded
independent candidates, but the Brotherhood would go on to do even better in the next round of
elections in 1987.23 By the 2000s, the regime had become acutely aware of the Brotherhood’s
potency as an opposition movement and was actively seeking to block its ascension. The NDP
officially banned parties from participating in elections and barred candidates from running on
overtly religious platforms, while the regime arrested scores of Brotherhood members who
seemed likely to launch independent bids for parliamentary seats.24 In spite of these measures,
Brotherhood candidates won 88 seats in the 2005 elections, marking “their most successful
electoral performance to date.”25
Ennahda, by contrast, “was almost entirely excluded from Tunisia’s political process,”
after the Ben Ali regime drove the party underground in the wake of its 1989 parliamentary
victories.26 Party founder Rached Ghannouchi spent the better part of the subsequent two
decades in exile in London and his movement had virtually no preexisting infrastructure when it
sought to stage a resurgence after Ben Ali fled the country. As a relatively unknown political
entity, Ennahda elicited suspicion from many members of the Tunisian public and press, with
some commentators worrying that the group would indulge in radical inclinations if it attained
power.27
This disparity in political experience between the Brotherhood and Ennahda likely
influenced the dissimilar results of their countries’ first post-revolution elections. While the
Brotherhood won both the Egyptian presidency and a majority in parliament, allowing it to
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govern unilaterally, Ennahda chose not to present a candidate in Tunisia’s presidential elections
and won few enough seats that it was required to join a coalition with two other secular parties in
order to govern.28 These contrasting outcomes would have significant implications for Egypt and
Tunisia’s democratic transitions.
In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases are
similar enough to form the basis of an effective comparative study while different enough to
enable me to build a convincing theory explaining their transitional outcomes. While many of
their similarities correspond to structural characteristics, most of their differences accentuate the
role of post-revolutionary agents such as the military and Islamist groups. These structural
similarities partially serve as controls in this study, while Egypt and Tunisians’ distinct agents
prove to be critical to my theoretical argument. In the following section, I examine the roles of
both structural and agent-based variables in effecting transitional outcomes for these two cases.

Structures Molded, Actors Mattered
To build my theory and supporting hypotheses, I draw from a body of research that
explains Egypt and Tunisia’s dissimilar transitions by examining both state characteristics and
the decision-making of post-revolutionary power brokers. Contributors to this research
specifically argue that the hegemony of the military in Egyptian society, the robust civic sector in
Tunisia, and the significant community of Tunisian émigrés who returned from Europe after the
Arab uprisings were important structural variables that influenced the countries’ divergent
transitional outcomes (In contrast to these scholars, I classify the military and civil society
groups as agents rather than state institutions).29 Furthermore, these authors contend that the
Muslim Brotherhood’s inseverable connection to its political wing—the Freedom and Justice
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Party (FJP), Egyptian Islamists’ appeal to economically leftist voters, and the Ennahda
movement’s commitment to political inclusiveness were the transitions’ most salient actorrelated variables.30 While I do not unreservedly agree with all these arguments, their structural
and agent-based orientations laid the groundwork for my own theory which contends that state
structures shaped influential actors, and those actors, in turn, shaped Egypt and Tunisia’s
transitions.
The structural set of arguments largely depict a post-revolutionary Egypt defined by
political exclusion and ossified institutions in contrast to a post-revolutionary Tunisia
characterized by relative political inclusiveness and a vibrant civil sector. Inmaculada Szmolka
posits that the Egyptian case demonstrated that an “elected government is not a sufficient
condition” for democratic consolidation and that a “legitimate authority [must
govern]…according to policies which have not been determined by actors such as the military.” 31
Tunisia, by contrast, showed what was possible when the military deferred to civilian authority.
Eva Bellin argues that a strong civil society that was absent in Egypt shepherded Tunisia’s
civilian government towards success by pressing for the popular accountability of the new
regime and for fostering constructive dialogue when political actors became bogged down in
petty disputes.32 Finally, Phillipe Fargues observes that for recently returned Tunisian émigrés
who had cultivated protest-centric attitudes in European states like France and Italy, “voting for
Ennahda was a natural form of protest.”33 Egypt, on the other hand, did not produce nearly as
many Europe-destined émigrés, depriving former opposition groups like the Brotherhood of a
potential base of support.
Meanwhile, the actor-related arguments contrast the FJP, which was attached at the hip to
the Muslim Brotherhood and relied heavily on appeals to left-wing populist tropes, with
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Ennahda, a party that largely operated independently of the religious organizations that birthed it.
Barbara Zollner specifically asserts that this disparity in organizational independence was a
critical factor in Egypt and Tunisia’s eventual transitional outcomes as it ran “parallel to the
formation of…new political system[s]” in those countries. 34 According to Zollner, social
movements’ capacity to formalize participation in elections reliably predicted their ability to
function as good democratic actors. 35 Tarek Masoud additionally submits that the FJP may have
been particularly inclined to drift towards illiberalism as it actively exploited the electorate’s
economic anxieties with populist rhetoric. In the 2012 elections, FJP candidates railed against
economic injustices such as high prices, unemployment, and income inequality. 36 The FJP’s
campaign strategy seems to have convinced Egyptian voters that the “Islamists [were] more
redistributive and more welfare-statist than” their secular leftist rivals.37 While the FJP would
pull off stunning victories in those elections, its experimentation with economic demagoguery
may have encouraged its authoritarian instincts which would land it in trouble with Egypt’s
activists and military down the road. Furthermore, the group may have set unrealistic
expectations which intensified voters’ dissatisfaction as abysmal economic conditions persisted.
Drawing from these and other arguments, I develop my own theory explaining Egypt and
Tunisia’s transitional outcomes using a series of structural and agent-based hypotheses. I first
acknowledge the potential role of structural variables in molding influential actors and thus
indirectly affecting the transitions. I then pay close attention to the role of three categories of
agents: the military, civil society groups, and the Islamists. By doing so, I hope to create a
comprehensive theoretical framework that can begin to elucidate the factors affecting
democratization in Egypt and Tunisia specifically, as well as in the Arab World more broadly.
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Structural Hypotheses
I first seek to test the argument that fundamental differences in the Egyptian and Tunisian
electorates—specifically in émigré communities and voter perceptions of the economy—gave
Ennahda enduring political relevance in the context of a successful Tunisian democratic
transition. Conversely, these differences supposedly led the Muslim Brotherhood and its political
arm, the FJP, to rapidly lose public support, priming Egypt to revert to authoritarianism. To test
these assertions, I employ the following hypotheses:
H1: Tunisia had a higher rate of émigrés who returned from exile in Europe after the Arab
uprisings than Egypt. These émigrés brought with them more pluralistic worldviews, greater trust
in democracy, and more intense anti-regime attitudes that ultimately benefited Ennahda
electorally.
H2.a: Tunisian voters had lower economic expectations for Ennahda than Egyptian voters did for
the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). These restrained expectations kept public levels of trust in
Ennahda from dropping too precipitously.
H2.b: Alternatively, Tunisian voters believed that Ennahda achieved its economic goals in a way
that distinguished it in positive ways from its secular competitors. By contrast, the FJP’s inability
to address economic issues in Egypt cut down its levels of public support, making it vulnerable
to an opportunistic military.

Agent-Based Hypotheses
I then seek to test the argument that pronounced military professionalism and independent civil
society in Tunisia ensured the integrity of the country’s transition, while the absence of these
variables proved detrimental to the Egyptian transition. I also test the assertion that Ennahda’s
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conciliatory and inclusive governing style in addition to its religious moderation allowed it to
remain a force in Tunisian politics, while the FJP’s authoritarian instincts and ideological
commitments played a central role in precipitating its loss of public support and the 2013 coup
that removed it from power. To test these arguments, I use the following hypotheses:
H3: The Egyptian military’s experience in conflicts with Israel in 1967 and 1973 and its deep
involvement in the economy made it the country’s ultimate power broker after democratic
elections. Tunisia’s military, by contrast, was inexperienced, removed from economic decisions,
and ultimately did not participate in a meaningful way in Tunisia’s democratic transition, making
room for civilian control.
H4: Since corruption within the Tunisian regime was concentrated at the highest levels of power,
Tunisia’s bureaucracies and civil society were less compromised and co-opted and played a
central role in ensuring a successful democratic transition. Egyptian institutions and civil society,
on the other hand, experienced broader corruption, fragmentation, and regime cooptation,
making them less prepared to guide the country’s transition.
H5: Tunisian voters responded positively to Ennahda’s participation in a governing coalition
with secular parties, while Egyptian voters viewed the FJP’s near unilateral seizure of the
legislature and executive branch as an authoritarian power grab.

H6.a: Ennahda moderated its religious platform more quickly and effectively than the FJP,
endearing it to Tunisia’s relatively secular electorate.
H6.b: Alternatively, Ennahda’s religious identity propelled the party to power and helped it
maintain support in the face of its secular competitors.
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Results
Émigré Communities
To examine émigré respondents’ attitudes towards Egypt and Tunisia’s Islamist parties, I
conduct multivariate regression analysis on survey data gathered by the Arab Barometer Project
Waves II and III. Wave II, which measures attitudes of Tunisian and Egyptian nationals between
2010 and 2011, surveyed 1,219 respondents in Egypt and 1,196 respondents in Tunisia. Wave III,
which measures attitudes of a comparable group of participants between 2012 and 2014, surveyed
1,196 respondents in Egypt and 1,199 respondents in Tunisia. 38 Based on my analysis of these
datasets, I find that émigré communities were neither significantly sympathetic nor hostile towards
the FJP or Ennahda during either of the two states’ democratic transitions.
For my regressions, I use respondent trust in Ennahda and the FJP as my dependent
variables and the time each respondent had spent in a European or North American country over
the last five years as my primary independent variable.39 I also include controls for respondent age,
gender, education, employment, marital status, religiosity, and income among my explanatory
variables. I then generate four regression models, one with controls and one without controls for
both Ennahda and the FJP. I pull from Arab Barometer Waves II and III in order to gauge
respondent levels of trust in Islamists both directly following the two states’ democratic
revolutions and around the time that the Egyptian military overthrew the Brotherhood government.
Given the ability of multivariate regressions to determine how significantly two variables correlate
to one another, I believe that this method is most appropriate for assessing whether Egyptian and
Tunisian émigrés were more or less likely to support Islamists than the general population.
Based on the results of these regressions (appendix 1, table 4), I deduce that any political
attitudes Tunisian and Egyptian respondents developed while visiting western countries played a
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negligible role in determining their level of support for Islamist parties. When examining the 20102011 regression output, I observe no statistically significant relationship between time spent in
Europe and trust for Islamists across any of my models, except for the coefficient for respondent
trust in the FJP when not accounting for control variables, which indicates a strong negative
correlation. Furthermore, the 2012-2014 regression output (appendix 1, table 6) indicates that
respondent time spent in Europe did not have a statistically significant impact on trust in Islamists
except for in the case of the Ennahda, and even that significance disappears when accounting for
control variables.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that any single corresponding, significant regressor which
corresponds to time spent in Europe (such as education) is responsible for diluting that variable’s
significance. For both the Wave II and Wave III regression output, time spent abroad negatively
correlates with trust in Islamists, while respondent education positively correlates with trust in
those groups, indicating that these variables had competing rather than complementary effects.
Overall, these results indicate that time spent in the West was not a salient factor in predicting
support for Ennahda and the FJP, either prior to Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutions or in the years
thereafter. I accordingly conclude that there is no evidence to support H1.

Voter Perceptions of Islamist Parties
In this section, I seek to understand how Egyptian and Tunisian voters’ attitudes toward
Islamist political movements both shaped those movements and potentially determined whether
they stayed in power. By doing so, I hope to discern what factors may have molded the actors
central to my study and ascertain which structural variables were relevant to the two states’
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contrasting transitions. I ultimately find that while economically dissatisfied Tunisian voters
actually blamed Ennahda more than comparable Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, these economic
considerations did not significantly affect transitional outcomes.
To determine the effect of voters’ high economic expectations on support for the Ennahda
Movement and the FJP during the 2011-2012 election season, I again run multivariate regressions
on Arab Barometer Wave II survey data. Based on this analysis, I find that Egyptian and Tunisian
respondents who had high expectations for their countries’ economic future during this period
were more likely to trust both the FJP and Tunisia respectively.
While I use the same outcome and control variables for these regressions as used in
previous models, this time I employ expectations for the economic situations in Egypt and Tunisia
as my explanatory variables. I focus on Arab Barometer Wave II data for these models in order to
accurately understand how Egyptian and Tunisian respondents perceived their economic futures
before their countries’ Islamist groups had a chance to govern. As with previous models, I believe
that multivariate regressions are better suited to describing the correlation between these variables
than any other research method.
From my regression output (see page 16, table 1), I observe that high economic
expectations had a statistically significant positive correlation to both Tunisian respondent trust
in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without accounting for control
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Table 1.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups
(2010-2011)
Regressors
Economic Expectations

Ennahda

Ennahda

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

0.142***
(0.0432)

0.0944**
(0.0451)
0.00149
(0.00417)
0.142
(0.0941)
0.146***
(0.0287)
-0.345***
(0.125)
0.0896
(0.115)
-0.294
(0.499)
0.158***
(0.0278)
-1.65e-08
(1.27e-08)
1.826***
(0.574)

0.0926**
(0.0383)

2.484***
(0.0799)

0.191***
(0.0504)
0.00352
(0.00389)
0.00859
(0.146)
0.0707***
(0.0256)
-0.0525
(0.118)
0.0970
(0.164)
-0.382*
(0.204)
-0.0246
(0.0581)
-3.12e-05
(6.41e-05)
2.208***
(0.344)

1,084
0.006

624
0.039

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Married
Religion (Muslim)
Mosque Attendance
Income
Constant

Observations
R-squared

2.369***
(0.0943)

919
811
0.011
0.078
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups (20122014)
Regressors
Economic Dissatisfaction

Table 2.

Con. Council

Con. Council

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

-0.461***
(0.00879)

-0.432***
(0.0449)
-0.00273
(0.00304)
0.0601
(0.0759)
0.0598**
(0.0249)
0.0441
(0.0915)
-0.111
(0.0928)
-

-0.324***
(0.00997)

3.622***
(0.0226)

-0.287***
(0.0145)
0.000257
(0.00107)
0.0247
(0.0277)
-0.493***
(0.00282)
0.0869***
(0.0291)
-0.0440
(0.0301)
-0.493***
(0.0427)
0.0546***
(0.00953)
-3.46e-08***
(4.43e-09)
3.809***
(0.0699)

13,771
0.072

7,030
0.102

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Married
Religion (Muslim)
Mosque Attendance
Income

0.0433*
(0.0256)
2.67e-10
(9.30e-09)
3.652***
(0.227)

Constant

3.967***
(0.0196)

Observations
R-squared

14,093
961
0.163
0.116
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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variables.40 Furthermore, the coefficients for these regressors indicate that when accounting for
other regressors, Egyptian respondents with high economic expectations were 9.66 percent more
likely to support the FJP than Tunisian respondents with similar expectations were to support
Ennahda. However, since the 95 percent confidence intervals for these two coefficients overlap, I
cannot conclude that the difference between them is statistically significant. Though it is difficult
to determine the directionality of the relationship between these two variables, these coefficients
seem to indicate that Egyptian and Tunisian voters who were optimistic about their countries’
economic prospects after toppling Mubarak and Ben Ali tended to attach their high hopes to
ascendant Islamist groups. This finding potentially validates part of H2.a, in that Egyptian voters
may have had higher economic expectations for the FJP than Tunisian voters had for Ennahda.
In order to understand how the economic attitudes of these respondents evolved as
Islamist parties won elections and as Egypt and Tunisia continued to face harsh economic
realities, I run further regression analysis on the same variables from previous models using data
from Arab Barometer Wave III. For these regressions, however, I use respondent perceptions of
then-economic conditions as my principle explanatory variable, rather than examining
respondent economic expectations. In this way, I hope to gauge whether respondents had linked
their dashed economic hopes with the Islamist parties which had prevailed in recent elections. I
hope that by focusing on these variables, I can gain insight into how Tunisian and Egyptian
voters perceived Islamist parties in an economic context after those parties had established
themselves as part of the government rather than the opposition.
The p-values produced by these regressions indicate that high levels of dissatisfaction
with the economy had a statistically significant negative correlation with both Tunisian
respondent trust in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without
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accounting for control variables (page 17, table 2).41 While supporters of Islamists had high
expectations for their countries’ economic prospects in 2010 and 2011, those respondents who
expressed dissatisfaction with their countries’ economic stagnation two years later tended to
blame the Islamists. This is to be expected, as Egyptian and Tunisian voters who believed in the
mission of Islamists would have a high degree of faith in those actors’ potential for economic
achievement, and those same voters would understandably become disillusioned with their
Islamist standard-bearers as economic conditions failed to improve.
These results undermine H2.a, however, as Tunisian voters dissatisfied with the economy
were less likely to trust the Tunisian Constitutional Council, which Ennahda led, than
economically dissatisfied Egyptians were to trust the Muslim Brotherhood. Specifically,
respondents in Tunisia who were unhappy with the economy were 46.1 percent less likely to
trust the Constitutional Council than respondents who were happy with the economy, while
Egyptian respondents who were dissatisfied with the economy were only 28.7 percent less likely
to trust the Muslim Brotherhood than more content Egyptian respondents. Since the regression
output for these two coefficients indicates that their respective 95 percent confidence intervals do
not overlap, I conclude that the divergent levels of trust in Tunisian and Egyptian Islamists differ
to a statistically significant degree and that economically disillusioned Tunisians are indeed less
likely to trust their country’s Islamists than their Egyptian counterparts. This finding contradicts
my hypothesis that Tunisian voters’ lower economic expectations kept their support for Ennahda
dropping more precipitously than Egyptian voters’ support for the Brotherhood, at least during
this period.
Finally, to gain a sense of how high levels of economic satisfaction influenced support for
Islamist groups, I again draw from Arab Barometer Wave III and find that while the Brotherhood
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enjoyed increased trust from economically satisfied voters, Ennahda did not. I conduct multivariate
regression analysis using the same control and outcome variables that I used to test H2.a, but this
time I include an explanatory variable for economic satisfaction, rather than dissatisfaction.
According to the p-values given in my regression output, when accounting for control variables,
economic satisfaction was only a reliable predictor of trust in Islamists with regard to the FJP, and
then only at a 90 percent confidence level (appendix 1, table 5). Furthermore, the coefficient for
the effect of economic satisfaction on trust in the FJP indicates a weak positive correlation. These
results tentatively contradict the postulation of H2.b that Tunisian voters supported Ennahda by
greater margins than Egyptian voters supported the FJP thanks to perceived success in the former’s
economic agenda.
How could this be? If disaffected voters in Tunisia blamed Ennahda for the country’s
economic woes to a greater extent than Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, and if Ennahda did not
benefit from any perceived economic achievements, why did Egyptian voters turn out en masse
to protest the Brotherhood in 2013, while Ennahda’s detractors largely stayed home? I suggest
that economic conditions had a more negligible impact on shaping the outcomes of Egypt and
Tunisia’s transitions than might be intuitive and that other variables—such as the FJP’s
authoritarian governing style—were ultimately more influential. This conclusion supports my
broader theory that structural variables, such as voter perceptions and attitudes, were less
relevant to Egypt and Tunisia’s transitional outcomes.

The Military
Through extensive historical process tracing, I conclude that Tunisia owes a great deal of
the success of its democratic transition to a unified, professional military that was cut out of the
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channels of power for decades. By contrast, Egypt’s less professional, extractive military played
a central role in the country’s return to authoritarianism. Drawing from these conclusions, I argue
that the disparity in the professionalization—or detachment from economic and political
interests—of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries was one of the three most relevant agent-based
variables affecting the two states’ divergent transitions.
Though the regime of former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was
exceptionally repressive, it did not rely on the military to maintain power to nearly the same
extent as did many of its authoritarian Arab neighbors. Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba,
“deliberately kept the military small,”42 and Ben Ali—himself a former internal security
officer—further eclipsed the military upon assuming office by elevating the police to a position
of supreme national power 43. In large part thanks to their close relationship with the new ruling
family, senior police officials cultivated profitable connections with Tunisia’s business elites,
while lower-level officers exploited opportunities for bribery and other corrupt practices. 44 The
police’s hegemony in the world of Tunisian cronyism and their critical role in the survival of the
regime meant that the military was excluded from the bulk of state profiteering. Furthermore,
unlike many of the Arab World’s other militaries, the Tunisian armed forces never participated
in combat and existed on the periphery of Tunisia’s national identity. 45
This marginalization gave the military very little incentive to back Ben Ali when protests
engulfed the country at the end of 2010 and ultimately boded well for the country’s democratic
transition. Indeed, Marc Lynch argues that “the endgame in Tunisia rested on the decision of the
independent military, which ultimately decided not to use excessive force against protestors and
then moved to push Ben Ali out of power.”46 After Ben Ali’s flight to Saudi Arabia, the armed
forces remarkably refrained from replacing him with the high-ranking general who had deposed
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him, Rachid Ammar.47 In continued deference to civilian authority, the military then stepped
back from the transition process altogether and allowed the Ben Achour Commission, a
“consensus-building body” comprised of civil society groups, to take charge. 48 Alfred Stepan
attributes the military’s unique restraint during this critical period to Tunisians’ relatively low
susceptibility to “Brumairian temptations.” According to Stepan, in comparison with other Arab
states such as Egypt which were skittish of ascendant Islamist groups, Tunisian voters were
ultimately less inclined to “[abdicate] their right to rule to soldiers—in…exchange for military
protection against perceived threats from…rivals newly empowered by democracy.” 49 This,
combined with the military’s independence from the vestiges of the Ben Ali regime and its
detachment from the Tunisian economy, paved the way for a successful civilian democratic
transition.
A quasi-professional military also played a central role in removing Egypt’s veteran
autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, from office. In contrast to Tunisia’s armed forces, however, the
Egyptian military enjoyed proximity to the seat of national power and was deeply involved in the
economy. In fact, the military’s economic interests were a critical factor in its decision to force
Mubarak out to begin with. Unlike Ben Ali, Mubarak—who had commanded Egypt’s air force in
the 1973 war against Israel—was a military fixture.50 And during a tenure which lasted longer
than that of any Egyptian leader since Muhammad Ali Pasha, 51 he helped his military colleagues
build “commercial and industrial empires”52 which depended on the political stability his regime
had carefully engineered. However, Mubarak’s eldest son and likely successor, Gamal,
threatened to disrupt that stability. It was an open secret that the military’s top brass despised
Gamal for shirking service in the armed forces and for promising to implement neo-liberal
reforms which might fracture their crony networks.53 Furthermore, in spite of its profound
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participation in the Egyptian economy, the military had been “thoroughly depoliticized so as to
avoid coups,” and “could not be deployed for naked regime-survival purposes,” severely limiting
its ultimate loyalty to the Mubarak family. 54 These factors, combined with reports of intense
lobbying of military leadership on part of the Obama administration, made the army’s decision
not to use violence against protestors and eventually depose Mubarak an unsurprising one. 55
Unlike the Tunisian military, however, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)
meddled extensively in Egypt’s early democratic transition and later exploited Egyptian voters’
receptivity to a Brumairian solution. While Tunisia had created an independent electoral
commission, which opened itself to international observers, the SCAF—which was unilaterally
responsible for orchestrating Egypt’s elections—initially prohibited international scrutiny of
electoral processes, ostensibly to prevent any violation of Egypt’s sovereignty. In response to
mounting international pressure, the SCAF eventually allowed a limited number of “electoral
followers” into the country, but their prerogative was severely restricted. 56 After the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salafist al-Nour Party claimed victory in those elections, the military began
working behind the scenes to undermine the new government. Finally, as Egyptians returned to
the streets to protest the Islamists’ increasingly illiberal policies and inability to address an ailing
economy, the military removed Brotherhood President Muhammad Morsi from power and
replaced him with Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Since taking office, Sisi has largely acted as an unabashed autocrat of the same mold as
Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian regime has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and essentially
coopted any remaining Islamists in parliament, while freedom of expression and political
mobilization have sunken to abysmal levels. These measures have ensured that Egypt’s postrevolutionary destiny has been starkly different from Tunisia’s.
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Civil Society and Corresponding Bureaucracies
Through similar process tracing, I now seek to understand the role that civil society
organizations and state institutions played in shaping Egypt and Tunisia’s transitions. From my
analysis, I conclude that strong civil society groups—particularly labor unions—were instrumental
in the survival of Tunisian democracy, whereas weak civil society groups conversely facilitated
Egypt’s authoritarian reversal. I do not find evidence, however, that Egypt and Tunisia’s political
institutions differed significantly enough to have explanatory power for this study’s research
question.
After the Islamists, civic organizations were arguably the most influential non-state actors
of the Tunisian democratic transition. As Bellin, observes, Tunisia had long been fertile ground
for a robust civil sector. Even in light of the intense repression they weathered from the Ben Ali
regime, civil society groups benefited from Tunisia’s unique “structural assets: a large middle
class, a relatively well-educated population, and the country’s proximity to…Europe—along with
[a] high level of Internet connectivity.”57 These favorable conditions laid the groundwork for
Tunisia’s most powerful labor union: the “Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail” (UGTT).
Though the Bourguiba regime would coopt the UGTT soon after seizing power, the union retained
a remarkable degree of independence, especially among its rank and file members. 58 The UGTT’s
experience negotiating with the regime through a series of strikes in the 70s and 80s gave it the
organizational savvy necessary to mobilize Tunisians across the country during the 2011 uprising
and eventually force Ben Ali to abdicate. 59 It also proved to be exceptionally influential in shaping
the country’s fledgling liberal government, and ultimately “played a decisive role in setting Tunisia
on the road to democratic transition.”60
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By contrast, Egyptian organized labor constituted a minority of the workforce and most
unions were state-controlled. Admittedly, workers’ groups staged multiple strikes leading up to
Mubarak’s departure and sought to affect the country’s transition by joining protestors. However,
their ultimate inability to wrest power from the Islamists or military meant that they “did not
become…indispensable central actor[s]” in Egypt’s democratic transition. 61
Unlike civil society groups, Egyptian and Tunisian state institutions did not differ
significantly from one another and had a negligible impact on Egypt and Tunisia’s divergent
transitional outcomes. While Egypt’s bureaucracies were marginally more compromised than
Tunisia’s, they continued to “allow the state to function under severe political and security
conditions.”62 In fact, Abdulmonem Almashat and Salwa Thabet argue that the Egyptian
bureaucracy “did its best” to protect the state from players with illiberal instincts such as the FJP
and the military.63 It seems that the Egyptian authoritarian backslide had less to do with the
corruption of its institutions and more to do with the strength of other actors whose agendas proved
to be at odds with democratic growth.
I accordingly find only partial support for H4. While the differences in Egypt and Tunisia’s
civil societies were predictive of the countries’ transitional outcomes, the differences in the
integrity of their bureaucracies had an inconsequential impact on those outcomes. This finding
supports my theory that actors such as civic groups ultimately had a more substantial impact on
the transitions than structural institutions such as bureaucracies.

Islamist Political Movements
Finally, I assess how the decisions and behavior of the FJP and Ennahda affected their
trustworthiness with voters. This question is of particular interest to this study since the massive
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public outcry against the Muslim Brotherhood likely gave the military the credibility it needed to
topple the elected Brotherhood government. In this section, I find that Ennahda’s participation in
a parliamentary coalition and its concessions to rival parties were critical to its political survival,
while the FJP’s seizure of the legislature and the presidency set the party on a fatal collision course
with Egyptian activists and armed forces. Conversely, I find no evidence that Ennahda’s religious
moderation played a significant role in enabling it to succeed where the Brotherhood failed.
I return to Arab Barometer Wave III and conclude that Ennahda benefited from governing
as part of a coalition while the FJP was hurt by its unilateral control of the Egyptian parliament
and presidential palace. For my two explanatory variables in this analysis, I use 1) respondents’
preference that a wide array of both secular and religious parties competes in national elections
and 2) respondents’ opposition to their government consistently passing legislation in accordance
with Islamic law. I substitute these regressors for my ideal variable (respondent preference that a
coalition, rather than a single party, form a government in parliament) as this data was not available
in Wave III. I proceed to use the same dependent and control variables used in earlier models.
From the output of these regressions (page 27, table 3), I observe that when accounting for
control variables, respondents who favored pluralistic elections were 8.68 percent more likely to
trust Ennahda than those who did not, while similar respondents did not exhibit a corresponding
increase of trust in the FJP. Predictably, both parties fared poorly at a significant level
among respondents who opposed their government enacting laws in accordance with Islamic law.
Based on these results, I infer that Ennahda earned the trust of Tunisia’s electorate by participating
in a parliamentary coalition, while Egyptian voters viewed the unconstrained FJP with suspicion.
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Table 3.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups (20122014)
Regressors
Pluralist Attitudes
Opposition to Islamic
State

Con. Council

Con. Council

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

0.0545***
(0.00834)
-0.0969***

0.0868***
(0.0293)
-0.155***

0.0226**
(0.00916)
-0.0363***

0.00617
(0.0124)
-0.0292**

(0.00986)

(0.0394)
-0.00237
(0.00317)
0.0305
(0.0796)
0.0240
(0.0263)
0.0247
(0.0992)
-0.143
(0.0984)
0.0590**
(0.0272)
4.38e-09
(1.01e-08)

(0.0106)

3.062***
(0.0287)

3.183***
(0.260)

2.955***
(0.0311)

(0.0149)
0.000770
(0.00115)
0.0398
(0.0297)
0.0108***
(0.00330)
-0.678***
(0.0310)
-0.0654**
(0.0320)
0.0494***
(0.0102)
-3.82e-08***
(4.62e-09)
-0.678***
(0.0452)
3.426***
(0.0775)

12,611
0.001

6,560
0.051

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Married
Mosque Attendance
Income
Religion (Muslim)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

12,846
896
0.011
0.049
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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I draw from Arab Barometer Wave III for a final time to find that while Ennahda benefited
from its coalition participation, it did not experience a significant increase in support for
moderating the Islamist platform. I run several multivariate regressions using the same control
and outcome variables from previous hypotheses, but this time I use respondents’
preferences for secular parties as my primary explanatory variable. Wave III, unfortunately, does
not provide any data reflecting respondents’ views on the religious platforms of Ennahda or the
FJP, but I consider a comparison of the levels of trust in the two groups among voters who
tend to support secular parties an acceptable substitute.
My results indicate a strong negative correlation between respondents’ preference for
secular parties and their support for Ennahda or the FJP, with and without control variables
(appendix 1, table 7). While the coefficient for the relationship between secular party preference
and trust in the FJP is more extreme than the same coefficient for trust in Ennahda, the confidence
intervals for the two coefficients overlap, indicating that the difference between them is not
statistically significant. I thus conclude that while there is tentative support for H6.a, I would need
to analyze additional data to confirm that Ennahda’s ideological moderation gave it the political
sustainability to outlast the FJP. Conducting further analysis on the effect of Ennahda’s moderation
might well verify arguments from prominent Arab authors such as Ghazi al Tuba, who contend
that the group’s drift towards the political center was crucial to its relative success.64 At this
juncture, however, I am unable to definitively prove or disprove H6.a, and accordingly can neither
rule on the validity of H6.b.
This analysis demonstrates that the two Islamist groups’ contrasting degrees of control over
their governments were predictive of their ultimate levels of support. H6 was correct. Tunisian
voters responded well to Ennahda’s participation in a coalition while Egyptian voters perceived
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the FJP’s control of the presidency and the legislature to be dangerously authoritarian. These voters
seemed less concerned, however, with their parties’ commitment to Islamic values. It seems that
Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists literally lived or died by their ability to convince the public that
they were team players.

Conclusion
The results of this study demonstrate that while state conditions certainly shaped Egypt
and Tunisia’s most influential post-revolutionary actors, the agents themselves, not the structures
that molded them, ultimately had the most definitive impact on transitional outcomes. As
discussed earlier in this paper, the military, Islamists, and civil society groups proved to be the
most important of these actors. I specifically contend that in Tunisia, a professional military that
played a minimal role in economic affairs paved the way for a civilian democratic transition,
while strong and independent civic organizations guided that transition during subsequent
political turbulence. Furthermore, the most successful party in Tunisia’s first elections—
Ennahda—governed as part of a coalition with two secular parties, assuaging the public’s fears
that it aimed to stage a complete Islamist takeover and discouraging widespread protests. In
Egypt, on the other hand, the military had a long history of using state industry to turn a profit,
meaning that it had a strong incentive to meddle in civilian politics well after deposing Mubarak
in order to secure its interests. After the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidency and dominated
the country’s parliamentary elections in 2012, the Islamists and armed forces were the only real
power brokers left in Egypt, especially with such an underdeveloped and disorganized civil
society. The authoritarian instincts of both groups made the country’s return to despotism
inevitable.
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The variables which were not influential in shaping the two states’ transitional outcomes
have significant implications as well. Economic grievances surprisingly did not determine which
Islamist-led government survived. In fact, Tunisians felt economic pain and blamed their leaders
to a greater degree than Egyptians did. Nor is there compelling evidence that Ennahda’s
moderation or the Brotherhood’s commitment to Islamic values were deciding factors in the two
parties’ fates. Rather it seems that Ennahda prevailed and the Brotherhood fell because Tunisians
believed the former was willing to work with one-time rivals in good faith while Egyptians saw
the latter as an uncompromising juggernaut barreling towards remaking the country to its liking.
In short, Egyptians and Tunisians cared more about pluralism and the rule of law than
they did about the economy or ideological purity. What is more, those liberal attitudes were just
as prevalent among voters who had lived in the Middle East their entire lives as they were among
voters who had been exposed to the political innovations of Europe and North America. These
popular attitudes collided with key actors to produce starkly different outcomes. In the end, these
countries’ actors—not structures—determined their political destinies. Democracy, it seems, is
not exclusively a Western import. It just needs the right agents who are willing and capable
enough to make it flourish.
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Appendix 1

Table 4.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups
(2010-2011)
Regressors
Time Spent in Europe

Ennahda

Ennahda

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

0.0118
(0.0435)

0.0283
(0.0479)
0.00105
(0.00400)
0.161*
(0.0918)
0.148***
(0.0280)
-0.367***
(0.120)
0.111
(0.111)
-0.262
(0.520)
0.157***
(0.0270)
-1.57e-08
(1.21e-08)
1.851***
(0.644)

-0.167***
(0.0320)

3.453***
(0.155)

0.0600
(0.0720)
0.00225
(0.00387)
0.0774
(0.144)
0.0668***
(0.0255)
-0.0583
(0.118)
0.0905
(0.156)
-0.356*
(0.210)
0.00804
(0.0566)
-2.13e-05
(6.61e-05)
2.205***
(0.542)

1,117
0.018

638
0.018

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Marriage
Religion (Muslim)
Mosque Attendance
Income
Constant

Observations
R-squared

2.596***
(0.214)

969
861
0.000
0.073
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 5.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups (20122014)
Regressors
Economic Satisfaction

Con. Council

Con. Council

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

5.92e-06**
(2.75e-06)

-0.127
(0.0965)
-0.00258
(0.00314)
0.0813
(0.0775)
0.0499*
(0.0263)
0.0350
(0.0972)
0.0620**
(0.0268)
3.20e-09
(9.65e-09)

2.14e-06
(4.25e-06)

2.979***
(0.00871)

3.047***
(0.250)

2.929***
(0.00931)

0.0711*
(0.0379)
0.000851
(0.00115)
0.0479*
(0.0289)
0.0123***
(0.00306)
0.104***
(0.0300)
0.0490***
(0.00986)
-3.61e-08***
(4.49e-09)
-0.134***
(0.0423)
-0.699***
(0.0422)
3.297***
(0.0803)

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Mosque Attendance
Income
Marriage
Religion (Muslim)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

14,093
961
13,771
0.000
0.027
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7,030
0.050
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Table 6.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups
(2012-2014)
Regressors
Time Spent in Europe

Con. Council

Con. Council

MB/FJP

MP/FJP

-0.111***
(0.00978)

0.00806
(0.0478)
-0.00266
(0.00317)
0.107
(0.0777)
0.0527**
(0.0267)
0.0153
(0.0981)
-0.132
(0.0973)
-

0.00652
(0.00989)

2.927***
(0.00999)

-0.00725
(0.0135)
0.00131
(0.00112)
0.0384
(0.0288)
0.0121***
(0.00306)
0.107***
(0.0301)
-0.0766**
(0.0311)
-0.711***
(0.0421)
0.0492***
(0.00991)
-3.59e-08***
(4.50e-09)
3.381***
(0.0686)

13,714
0.000

6,974
0.049

Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Married
Religion (Muslim)
Mosque Attendance
Income

0.0545**
(0.0269)
5.04e-09
(9.76e-09)
2.917***
(0.227)

Constant

3.018***
(0.00919)

Observations
R-squared

14,025
948
0.010
0.027
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.
Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in
Islamist Groups (20122014)
Regressors

Con. Council

Con. Council

MB/FJP

MB/FJP

-0.137***
(0.00957)

-0.237***
(0.0328)
-0.00286
(0.00332)
0.00727
(0.0850)
0.0369
(0.0284)
0.105
(0.102)
-0.0446
(0.106)
0.0178
(0.0287)
1.35e-08
(1.01e-08)

-0.324***
(0.00962)

Constant

3.350***
(0.0289)

3.716***
(0.274)

3.819***
(0.0278)

-0.303***
(0.0145)
0.000184
(0.00127)
0.0148
(0.0326)
0.00778**
(0.00371)
0.0420
(0.0347)
-0.0376
(0.0351)
0.0105
(0.0116)
-3.29e-08***
(4.95e-09)
-0.380***
(0.0500)
4.057***
(0.0834)

Observations
R-squared

10,552
809
0.019
0.080
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

10,368
0.094

5,308
0.128

Secular Party Preference
Age
Gender (Male)
Education
Employment
Married
Mosque Attendance
Income
Religion (Muslim)
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